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I. INTRODUCTION 
The title and topic of my Article, “Justice and Elegance for Hedgehogs – in 
Life, Law, and Literature,” owes its genesis to pure coincidence; I noticed the 
best-selling novel, The Elegance of the Hedgehog, by Muriel Barbery1 on a 
book display table at the same time that I embarked on reading Justice for 
Hedgehogs in preparation for this conference.  In this Article, I will argue that 
certain features of Dworkin’s book and Barbery’s novel make it fruitful to read 
them in tandem and that the comparison may be serendipitous, but not 
arbitrary.  Dworkin’s frequent turn to literature and to literary interpretation as 
germane to his project might warrant description of Justice for Hedgehogs as a 
work in “law and literature.”  By this, I refer to two aspects of the law and 
literature methodology: (1) a focus on interpretation as a common task in law 
and literature; and (2) a focus on narrative.  The two books use the term 
“hedgehog” in distinct ways: in Dworkin’s case, to connote unity of value and, 
in Barbery’s, to connote a solitary life of concealed elegance.  Nonetheless, I 
will argue that it is illuminating to consider how the main characters of The 
Elegance of the Hedgehog – and their narratives – look when measured by the 
framework offered by Dworkin’s book. 
A. From Value Pluralism to Value Holism 
At a time when value pluralism and even value polarization seem to be 
undeniable facts of contemporary life,2 Ronald Dworkin unrepentantly defends 
the unity of value.  In his book, Justice for Hedgehogs, Dworkin defends this 
“large and old philosophical thesis” against various “foxy causes,” such as 
value skepticism, value pluralism, value conflict, and the supposed opposition 
between the values of self-interest and those of personal and political 
morality.3  Dworkin’s point of departure is the Greek poet Archilochus’s 
saying, “The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing,” 
made famous in liberal philosopher Isaiah Berlin’s essay, The Hedgehog and 
 
1 MURIEL BARBERY, THE ELEGANCE OF THE HEDGEHOG (Alison Anderson trans., Europa 
Editions 2008) (2006).  As I edit this Article, the novel has been on the New York Times 
Paperback Best Sellers list for over a year.  Paperback Best Sellers: Fiction: Trade, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 21, 2010, § BR, at 20 (ranking The Elegance of the Hedgehog in the top twenty 
for over a year). 
2 Normative and legal pluralism remain topics of intense interest in social and political 
life and in law and the legal academy.  See generally, e.g., WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL 
PLURALISM (2002); Brian Z. Tamanaha, Understanding Legal Pluralism, 30 SYDNEY L. 
REV. 375 (2008).  For example, on recent diagnoses of “values polarization” in the United 
States and its relationship to value pluralism, see Linda C. McClain, Red Versus Blue (and 
Purple) States and the Same-Sex Marriage Debate: From Values Polarization to Common 
Ground?, 77 UMKC L. REV. 415, 415-20 (2008). 
3 RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS (forthcoming 2010) (Apr. 17, 2009 
manuscript at 7-15, on file with the Boston University Law Review). 
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the Fox.4  In Justice for Hedgehogs, Dworkin argues for the integration of 
ethics, personal morality, and political morality and contends that law is a 
branch of political morality that in turn is a branch of morality, broadly 
understood.5  The hedgehog’s “full value holism” is its “faith that all true 
values form an interlocking network, that each of our convictions about what is 
good or right or beautiful plays some role in supporting each of our other 
convictions in each of those domains of value.”6  As in much of Dworkin’s 
work, a critical step is identifying, and persuading readers of, shared principles 
with potent explanatory force in making sense of convictions and illuminating 
common ground.7  In this new work, human dignity is the basic concept from 
which flow principles of self-respect and authenticity, with a corresponding 
special “responsibility project” each person has, to identify and pursue value in 
life.8  As in Dworkin’s other work, interpretation is a critical method for 
achieving integration.  But in contrast to Dworkin’s previous concentration on 
developing an account of interpretation in law and political morality, Justice 
for Hedgehogs has greater ambitions: it theorizes about common features of 
the interpretive process across many different fields, and also puts 
interpretation at the heart of how people answer fundamental questions about 
what it means to live well and how we should treat each other. 
Dworkin’s project of developing an interpretive account of the unity of 
value spans many centuries of philosophy.  It addresses basic questions about 
the nature of interpretation in literature and other fields.  It asserts fundamental 
contrasts between the process of establishing truth in science and the process 
of doing so in other fields of human endeavor.  It appeals to readers’ basic 
intuitions about how to live, why their lives – and the lives of others – are 
important, and whether and why something is true.  Alongside the hedgehog 
and fox are many characters facing ethical and moral challenges.  Dworkin 
takes his reader on an intellectual journey that includes encounters with poems 
by Yeats, plays by Shakespeare, revered paintings, characters from classic 
novels, and theories of literary interpretation.9  The broad scope and ambition 
of Dworkin’s book push it beyond the category of a conventional work of 
jurisprudence.  Indeed, “law” is the explicit focus of just one short chapter of 
 
4 Isaiah Berlin, The Hedgehog and the Fox, in RUSSIAN THINKERS 22, 22 (Henry Hardy 
& Aileen Kelly eds., 1978). 
5 DWORKIN, supra note 3 (manuscript at 76). 
6 Id. (manuscript at 76-77). 
7 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, IS DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE HERE? 7 (2006); RONALD 
DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND 
INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 9-23 (1993) [hereinafter DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION].  For my 
assessment of these works, see, for example, McClain, supra note 2, at 420-37 (evaluating 
Is Democracy Possible Here?); Linda C. McClain, Toleration, Autonomy, and 
Governmental Promotion of Good Lives: Beyond “Empty” Toleration to Toleration as 
Respect, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 19, 95-100 (1998) (evaluating Life’s Dominion).  
8 DWORKIN, supra note 3 (manuscript at 10-11). 
9 See id. (manuscript at 79-109). 
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the book, where Dworkin challenges a two-system view of law and morality.10  
For these reasons, Justice for Hedgehogs emboldens – if not invites – 
assessments that step outside the four corners of conventional legal 
scholarship.  This Article is in that spirit. 
B. Comparing Hedgehogs – An Exercise in Law and Literature 
The genesis of this Article, as noted above,11 was a coincidence: how many 
current book titles, after all, refer to hedgehogs?12  A seemingly random choice 
based on an amusing coincidence appeared more serendipitous and less 
arbitrary when I noticed that reviewers described Barbery’s novel as a 
“philosophical fable,”13 in which the book’s two protagonists “create eloquent 
little essays on time, beauty and the meaning of life.”14  What intrigued me 
even more as I began to read the novel is that these two protagonists, Renée 
(Madame Michel), a fifty-four-year-old concierge, and Paloma, a twelve-year-
old girl, are closet intellectuals who hide their intelligence and talent from the 
world around them and live a secretive life of the mind.  Hiding one’s light 
under a bushel seems to be the opposite of the expected life of an academic, 
and thus an intriguing plot device.  Further, Barbery’s “elegance of the 
hedgehog” – Renée’s strategy of concealment and avoidance – seems 
antithetical to the value holism of Dworkin’s hedgehog, who seeks integration 
of ethics and morality, such that the best account of ethics, or living well 
(“what they should aim to be and achieve in their own lives”), informs the best 
understanding of morality, or living a good life (“how people must treat other 
people”).15  Indeed, a life path of concealment and avoidance is the opposite of 
the challenge model of ethics as modeled by Dworkin himself, who 
relentlessly devotes his talents and intelligence to tackling basic questions of 
justice and equality and educating the public about pressing legal and political 
questions, earning the accolade “our leading public philosopher.”16  
In this Article, I will argue that certain features of Dworkin’s book and 
Barbery’s novel make it productive to compare them.  Reading Dworkin’s 
book in tandem with a work of literature is fitting given Dworkin’s own 
frequent turn to literature and to literary interpretation in Justice for 
 
10 Id. (manuscript at 252-58).  Political morality and rights receive a bit more attention, 
but here, Dworkin urges the reader to incorporate by reference his previous writings.  Id. 
(manuscript at 208). 
11 See supra text accompanying note 1. 
12 As it turns out, more than I initially thought; this comparative project would look quite 
different if I had first happened upon HUGH WARWICK, THE HEDGEHOG’S DILEMMA: A TALE 
OF OBSESSION, NOSTALGIA, AND THE WORLD’S MOST CHARMING MAMMAL (2008). 
13 BARBERY, supra note 1, at cover (citing ELLE (Italy)). 
14 Caryn James, Thinking on the Sly, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2008, § BR, at 23. 
15 DWORKIN, supra note 3 (manuscript at 8).  
16 T.M. Scanlon, Partisan for Life, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, July 15, 1993, at 45 (reviewing 
DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION, supra note 7).  
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Hedgehogs, which might support deeming it a work in “law and literature.”  
By this, I refer to two aspects of the law and literature methodology: (1) a 
focus on interpretation as a common task in law and literature; and (2) a focus 
on narrative, or stories.  
With respect to the first dimension, Justice for Hedgehogs frequently 
discusses art, literature, philosophy, and music to illustrate arguments about the 
centrality of interpretation as a method for determining truth.  It argues for 
certain critical features that hold across all domains of interpretation.17  
Interpretation is also germane to The Elegance of the Hedgehog, in which the 
characters richly discuss the meaning of great art and literature and why they 
move us.  Both books ponder the significance of nature – of evolution, of 
humans as animals and yet distinct from other animals because of human 
consciousness.18  
With respect to the second dimension, both Dworkin’s book and Barbery’s 
novel make use of narrative.  The Elegance of The Hedgehog consists of 
narratives and journal entries by its two central characters.  This structure 
allows the reader to relate intimately to the narrators and to travel with them on 
their journeys of self-discovery and transformation.  The narrative form makes 
their worldviews palpable and accessible.  Moreover, through these narratives, 
the author anchors philosophy to a story as a way of “exploring the bearing 
philosophy could really have on one’s life, and how.”19   
Narrative is also at the heart of Justice for Hedgehogs in several ways.  
First, Dworkin draws analogies between life and literature, arguing for a 
“narrative view” of life; each person has a special responsibility to construct a 
narrative of his or her life.20  Second, Dworkin turns to characters in classic 
works of literature – for example, A Tale of Two Cities – to illustrate his points 
about lives lived well or badly.21  This use of literary examples makes 
considerable sense given Dworkin’s philosophy that our responsibility project 
resonates with a “narrative view” of our lives.22  Thus, he suggests that we can 
look at lives of literary characters to sort out questions of free will or 
 
17 In previous work, Dworkin argued that “we can improve our understanding of law by 
comparing legal interpretation with interpretation in other fields of knowledge, particularly 
literature.”  RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 146 (1985). 
18 See, e.g., BARBERY, supra note 1, at 59; DWORKIN, supra note 3 (manuscript at 11). 
19 Interview by Virginia Musumeci with Muriel Barbery (Apr. 15, 2008), 
http://www.bookbrowse.com/author_interviews/full/index.cfm?author_number=1656 
(quoting Barbery). 
20 DWORKIN, supra note 3 (manuscript at 144). 
21 Dworkin discusses how self-blame featured in the life of Sydney Carton (from Charles 
Dickens’s A Tale of Two Cities): he blamed himself for living a bad life out of “weakness 
and indolence,” and “until his redemption, drank his life away beside the winding sheet in 
his candle.”  Id. (manuscript at 126, 129).  However, Carton also managed to redeem his life 
“because an extraordinary coincidence made it possible for him to do a far, far better thing 
than he had ever done.”  Id. (manuscript at 131). 
22 Id. (manuscript at 144). 
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determinism and ask, were such characters responsible for their actions?  
Moreover, he draws an analogy between questions we might ask about Emma 
Bovary, for example, and questions we might ask about finding responsibility 
in our own lives: 
You judge your responsibility it [sic] in the same way as you might ask, 
for example, whether Emma Bovary was responsible for what she did or 
whether her crippling social and domestic environment was such as to 
exclude responsibility.  You make sense of that question about her by 
occupying the world of the novel and treating it as real.  Given that 
assumption, you rely only on what you find in that world – facts about 
Madame Bovary’s circumstances as they might appear to her – her 
thoughts, ambitions, motives, decisions, acts, and environment – to 
decide about her judgmental responsibility.  We can treat ourselves in 
much the same way.  We can take our decisions at [sic] they seem to us 
and then ask about our responsibility for the story we have written 
through those decisions.23 
This turn to narratives in Dworkin’s book nicely invites my own examination 
of the lives led by the two narrators in The Elegance of the Hedgehog, and of 
how well Dworkin’s key conceptions fit the characters’ narratives. 
A third way that narrative features in Justice for Hedgehogs is Dworkin’s 
intimate style.  By addressing his reader as “you,” he appears to engage in a 
sustained narrative of his substantive philosophy.  He unveils the pieces of his 
argument step by step, and, at each step, explains to his reader what a certain 
assumption or principle means, seeking to persuade his reader that this is, in 
fact, how he or she thinks.  For example, as Dworkin elaborates on his account 
of ethics and sets out his two principles of self-respect and authenticity, he tells 
his reader that he assumes “that you suppose, self-consciously or not, that it is 
a matter of objective importance how your life goes.”24  Instead of the more 
typical formulation, “one might think,” or “one might believe,” he consistently 
speaks of what “you” might think or believe.25  He admonishes his reader.26  
As he proceeds, he insists on his reader’s active engagement, peppering the 
reader with questions and imagining responses he or she might make.  He 
brings the reader in to acknowledge what “our problem” is in working out 
tensions between certain principles: “We must show respect for the equal 
objective importance of every person’s life while not cheating on our 
responsibility to make something valuable of our own life.”27  He writes of 
what “we” must do to solve these problems, immediately returning to his 
readers to explain what this would mean if they were persuaded by and tried to 
 
23 Id. 
24 Id. (manuscript at 129). 
25 Id. (manuscript at 129, 162). 
26 Id. (manuscript at 129). 
27 Id. (manuscript at 174). 
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live by a particular interpretation of a particular principle.28  At times, Dworkin 
and the “you” he addresses are united in rejecting certain arguments.29 
This narrative format, exemplified through Dworkin’s use of “you,” relates 
to the book’s “general strategy” of a first person, rather than third person 
approach to responsibility: “When we begin in the first rather than the third 
person we pay more attention to how it feels to be confronted with a decision.  
We pay more attention, in particular, to the impossibility of deciding without 
taking responsibility for how one has decided.”30  Because Dworkin begins 
with ethics, or what we owe ourselves, and works out from there to morality, 
his focus is, in effect, phenomenological.  Rather than asking what people 
ought to do under certain hypothetical situations, he asks, “how and why 
people normally hold themselves responsible for what they have done, and 
why, in some circumstances, they do not and should not do so.”31 
Dworkin enlists narrative and adopts a narrative style with a view to 
persuading readers of value holism.  This use is in tension with another role of 
narrative, as scholars of law and literature teach: to disrupt.  Stories may serve 
as checks against grand theories or models of reasoning that seem to reassure 
by providing an organizing framework.  Martha Minow argues, “Stories 
disrupt these rationalizing, generalizing modes of analysis with a reminder of 
human beings and their feelings, quirky developments, and textured vitality.”32  
By “invit[ing] both teller and listener to confront messy and complex realities,” 
storytelling “promotes communication and thinking about how to connect the 
past and the future by thinking about what to do.”33  Stories, in their “textured 
vitality,” seem to take us into the domain of the fox toward pluralism, since 
there are as many stories as there are lives and narrators.  Indeed, the mode of 
the story form lends itself to “portraying the plurality of human viewpoints on 
any given event,” which can enable expanding one’s imagination.34  Minow 
explains that “commitments to narrative revel in particularity, difference, and 
resistance to generalization.”35 
This notion of narratives as disruptive is in apparent tension with Dworkin’s 
unity of value project, but, by contrast, fits comfortably with Barbery’s novel.  
Renée’s and Paloma’s narratives challenge the fixed and comfortable ways of 
understanding the world held by those around them.  I will consider whether 
these narratives also disrupt the theoretical framework offered by Dworkin 
 
28 Id. 
29 See, e.g., id. (manuscript at 166) (“Someone – not you – might say: it is no reason to 
choose one set of interpretations of our principles that we avoid conflict by doing so.”). 
30 Id. (manuscript at 139). 
31 Id. 
32 Martha Minow, Stories in Law, in LAW’S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN LAW 
24, 36 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996). 
33 Id. at 33. 
34 Id. at 33-34. 
35 Id. at 35. 
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himself, of life as a performance and of personal responsibility to construct a 
coherent narrative.  Stories standing alone, of course, do not tell us what to do; 
nor do they yield “principles likely to provide consistency in generalizations to 
guide future action.”36  Interpretation is necessary.  Just as interpretation is 
central to Dworkin’s task of value holism, the narrators in The Elegance of the 
Hedgehog embark on their own interpretive projects. 
In the rest of this Article, I explore what Dworkin’s and Barbery’s books 
have in common beyond the word “hedgehog” in their titles.  I will first note 
the two distinct ways in which these books use this term: to connote unity of 
value versus to connote a solitary life of concealed elegance.  I then consider 
how the main characters of The Elegance of the Hedgehog – and their 
narratives – look when measured by the framework offered by Dworkin’s 
book.  In particular, I look at what factors led the novel’s characters to live 
concealed lives, and how these factors implicate issues of justice.  I look at the 
characters’ stance on life’s meaning and on why art matters.  I will examine 
whether and how their approach to their lives maps onto Dworkin’s conception 
of a special responsibility for living a good life and living well.  I also suggest 
how dignity – and indignity – features explicitly in Dworkin’s normative 
framework and implicitly in the novel, making my comparison fruitful.  
Finally, I offer some concluding reflections on the role of narrative in law and 
literature. 
II. COMPARING DWORKIN’S AND BARBERY’S BOOKS  
A. On Being a Hedgehog: Value Holism or Concealed Elegance?  
1. The Hedgehog’s Arduous Search for Value Holism 
During the conference, Dworkin argued for the worldview associated with 
Archilochus’s famous hedgehog who knows “one big thing.”37  Some speakers 
supported this project, while others argued against the premise of a unity of 
value and more in favor of what Dworkin calls “foxy causes.”38  In the essay 
that made that hedgehog famous, Isaiah Berlin associated the proverb with 
reflecting a “great chasm” in worldviews of writers and thinkers.39  The 
hedgehog represents the “monist,” or those who “relate everything to a single 
central vision, one system less or more coherent or articulate, in terms of which 
they understand, think and feel – a single, universal, organising principle in 
 
36 Id. 
37 See Ronald Dworkin, Keynote Address: Justice for Hedgehogs, 90 B.U. L. REV. 469 
(2010). 
38 In support, see generally C. Edwin Baker, In Hedgehog Solidarity, 90 B.U. L. REV. 
759 (2010); for a critique, see Martha Minow & Joseph Singer, In Favor of Foxes: 
Pluralism as Fact and Aid to the Pursuit of Justice, 90 B.U. L. REV. 903 (2010). 
39 Berlin, supra note 4, at 22. 
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terms of which alone all that they are and say has significance.”40  On the fox 
side is the “pluralist,” or “those who pursue many ends, often unrelated and 
even contradictory, connected, if at all, only in some de facto way, for some 
psychological or physiological cause, related to no moral or aesthetic 
principle.”41  
Dworkin’s “one big thing” is a value holism of rather astonishing scope.  He 
refers to “the hedgehog’s faith that all true values form an interlocking 
network, that each of our convictions about what is good or right or beautiful 
plays some role in supporting each of our other convictions in each of those 
domains of value.”42  He ventures into the domain of ethics to a degree he has 
not before.  He seeks “to illustrate as well as defend the unity of at least ethical 
and moral values: . . . a theory of what living well is like and what, if we want 
to live well, we must do for – and not do to – other people.”43  This idea is a 
“substantive creed; it proposes a way to live.”44  Dworkin aims to provide a 
“template” for unifying ethics and morality.45  
The life that Dworkin envisions for one with the hedgehog’s faith is 
arduous.  Questions about value, Dworkin insists, are unavoidable: “So long as 
we live at all we cannot escape the question of what to do and that question 
presupposes at least the sense of the opinion that it is better to act in one way 
rather than another.”46  In insisting on human responsibility to live an 
examined life, Dworkin analogizes life to art: “The unexamined life, as the 
 
40 Id.  This usage of the hedgehog as monist, or pursuing one big thing, is popular.  An 
internet search revealed, for example, a journal on contemporary culture, The Hedgehog 
Review, with each issue addressing a single theme, and The Hedgehog Blog: Political and 
Social Observations from Two Aspiring Hedgehogs Who Love the Isaiah Berlin Essay, 
which evaluates politicians based on whether they focus on a few big things or on lots of 
details.  HEDGEHOG REV.: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON CONTEMP. CULTURE, 
http://www.virginia.edu/iasc/publications_hedgehog_review.php (last visited Mar. 7, 2010); 
Hedgehog Blog, http://hedgehogcentral.blogspot.com (last visited Mar. 7, 2010).  
Motivational speaker Jim Collins offers a video series, “The Hedgehog Concept,” promising 
to help people and businesses find their “personal hedgehog.”  Jim Collins, The Hedgehog 
Concept, http://www.jimcollins.com/media_topics/hedgehog-concept.html (last visited Mar. 
7, 2010).  In an editorial, Peggy Noonan invoked Berlin’s distinction to criticize President 
Obama, early in his term, for seeming neither a fox nor a hedgehog.  Peggy Noonan, 
Editorial, Neither a Hedgehog nor a Fox, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 2009, at A11. 
41 Berlin, supra note 4, at 22. 
42 DWORKIN, supra note 3 (manuscript at 76-77). 
43 Id. (manuscript at 7). 
44 Id. 
45 Id. (manuscript at 15).  The hedgehog’s holism extends to rejecting many other 
apparent tensions or binaries, for example, between positive and negative liberty and 
between liberty and equality.  Id. (manuscript at 230-31).  Some of Dworkin’s arguments for 
unity or a common set of principles recapitulate assertions in his earlier work; some are 
new.  Engaging with these arguments is outside the scope of this Article.   
46 Id. (manuscript at 259). 
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ancient philosophers warned us, is a bad life.  Just as a certain kind or level of 
originality is essential to responsibility in art, so it is essential to responsibility 
in living.”47  
What does responsibility in living require?  Dworkin posits a “responsibility 
project” of interpretive reasoning, which “aims to integrate our various 
convictions in as large a network of moral convictions as we can, trying to 
make sure we act out of our convictions rather than for other motives.”48  
Responsibility is central to his two “dignity” principles of self-respect and 
authenticity, that “each person has a special, personal responsibility for 
identifying what counts as success in his own life,” and for creating a 
“coherent narrative” of his life “that he himself has chosen and endorses.”49  
Government, in turn, he posits, must respect these two dignitary principles.  
In a surprising turn to religious language (given his theory’s reliance upon 
interpretation and argument, rather than revelation), Dworkin refers to his 
“catechism” that integration and authenticity are both necessary to reach 
correct interpretations.50  We aim to achieve an integration in which we can 
believe.51  The role of persuasive argument is central: unlike scientific truth, 
truth with respect to values rests on interpretation.  “Value judgments are true, 
when they are true, not in virtue of any matching but in virtue of the 
substantive case that can be made for them.  The moral realm is the realm of 
argument, not brute, raw fact.”52  Thus, Dworkin speaks repeatedly of 
“earning” the right to speak of truth.   
As Dworkin explains the process by which we should exercise moral 
responsibility, he uses the motif of expanding domains and claiming territory.53  
We should “seek deep coherence among our convictions,” claiming more 
territory for conviction as we “make our convictions into as dense and 
effective a filter surrounding our decision making as we can.”54  No one can 
achieve these goals perfectly, and so moral responsibility is a “work in 
progress.”55  Moral and political philosophers, in Dworkin’s schema, have a 
special role and responsibility to engage in moral interpretation in which they 
“construct articulate bodies of value and principle out of widely shared but 
disparate moral inclinations, reactions, ambitions and traditions.”56  This 
division of labor helps by providing templates to other people who share 
similar values in their own process of reflection.  
 
47 Id. (manuscript at 260). 
48 Id. (manuscript at 10). 
49 Id. (manuscript at 126). 
50 Id. (manuscript at 166). 
51 Id. 
52 Id. (manuscript at 9). 
53 Id. (manuscript at 70). 
54 Id. (manuscript at 70, 76). 
55 Id. (manuscript at 71). 
56 Id. 
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What, then, is a good life?  “Someone lives well when he identifies and 
pursues a good life for himself and does so with dignity: with respect for the 
importance of other people’s lives as well as his own and for their 
responsibility to seek a good life as well as his own.”57  In this passage, the 
unity of ethics and morality is evident. 
An intriguing feature of Dworkin’s book, stemming perhaps from his use of 
perception of an analogy between life and art, is his notion of life having 
“adverbial,” not “adjectival,” value.  “The value of the striving is adverbial: it 
does not lie in the goodness or impact of the life realized.”58  Here he draws 
heavily on the Romantics’ notion of making one’s life a work of art, of living 
life as a skillful performance.  This notion also has an existentialist cast, as he 
refers to the challenge of living in a way that “stands up to” the inevitability of 
death:  
Each of us bursts at once with life and the shadow of inevitable death: we 
are alone among animals conscious of that apparently absurd situation.  
The only value we can find in living that stands up to death is adverbial 
value.  We must find the value of living – the meaning of life – in living 
well just as we find value in painting or writing or singing or diving well.  
There is no other enduring value or meaning in our lives, but that is 
meaning and value enough.59 
I will return to this distinction between adverbial and adjectival value in my 
analysis of Barbery’s novel.60  
2. The Hedgehog’s Defense, or Another View of the One Big Thing the 
Hedgehog Knows 
The Elegance of the Hedgehog makes different use of the hedgehog than to 
contrast the unity and the plurality of value, as the author makes explicit about 
halfway into the novel.  The hedgehog stands for concealed elegance and the 
unexpected contrast between external appearance and a keen and solitary inner 
life.  Renée, fifty-four-years-old and the concierge for twenty-seven years of a 
“fine hôtel particulier” in Paris, is a closet intellectual and autodidact.61  Early 
on, she describes herself as “short, ugly, and plump;” she did not go to college 
and has always been “poor, discreet, and insignificant.”62  She is all too willing 
to play to social prejudices by behaving as her assumed betters – the residents 
of the building – expect her to behave: 
Because I am rarely friendly – though always polite – I am not liked, but 
am tolerated nonetheless: I correspond so very well to what social 
 
57 Id. (manuscript at 260). 
58 Id. 
59 Id. (manuscript at 11). 
60 See infra Part II.B.1. 
61 BARBERY, supra note 1, at 19. 
62 Id. 
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prejudice has collectively construed to be a typical French concierge that 
I am one of the multiple cogs that make the great universal illusion turn, 
the illusion according to which life has a meaning that can be easily 
deciphered.63 
Renée has arranged her life so that the residents of the building hear the 
television running in the front room of her loge, confirming their social 
expectations, while she is free to hide herself “in the back room, perfectly 
euphoric, [her] eyes filling with tears, in the miraculous presence of Art.”64 
Renée’s lifetime of concealment comes to an end when a new tenant, Mr. 
Kakuro Ozu, discerns that there is more to her than she lets on.  His ability to 
see her in turn triggers a more discerning gaze by the book’s other main 
protagonist, Paloma, after Kakuro asks Paloma’s opinion of their concierge 
and says that he thinks she is “a clandestine erudite princess.”65  This confirms 
Paloma’s own suspicions and she decides that Renée has the elegance of the 
hedgehog: 
She radiates intelligence.  And yet she really makes an effort, like, you 
can tell she is doing everything she possibly can to act like a concierge 
and come across as stupid.  But I’ve been watching her . . . Madame 
Michel has the elegance of the hedgehog: on the outside, she’s covered in 
quills, a real fortress, but my gut feeling is that on the inside, she has the 
same simple refinement as the hedgehog: a deceptively indolent little 
creature, fiercely solitary – and terribly elegant.66 
The hedgehog is, indeed, a solitary animal.  If attacked, it will “curl into a 
prickly and unappetizing ball that deters most predators.”67  This defensive 
meaning of hedgehog is an interpretation that Berlin himself notes.  He begins 
his essay by reporting differing scholarly interpretations of Archilochus’s 
famous words and observes that they “may mean no more than that the fox, for 
all his cunning, is defeated by the hedgehog’s one defence.”68  Here, the 
protective ball into which Renée retreats has two elements: first, projecting a 
personal appearance and using a manner of speech that play to class prejudice 
and second, turning her loge into an inner sanctum, while allowing its exterior 
to satisfy social expectations. 
Is Renée also a hedgehog in the sense that Dworkin means?  Does she – like 
his hedgehog – seek “value holism?”69  Is she engaged in a responsibility 
 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 21. 
65 Id. at 144. 
66 Id. at 143.   
67 National Geographic, Hedgehog: Erinaceus Europeaeus, 
http://animals.nationalgeographic.com/animals/mammals/hedgehog.html (last visited Sept. 
22, 2009).  
68 Berlin, supra note 4, at 22. 
69 DWORKIN, supra note 3 (manuscript at 76-77). 
  
2010] JUSTICE AND ELEGANCE FOR HEDGEHOGS 875 
 
project?  Is her conscious decision to separate her inner life (in which she lives 
well) and her outer life (as a cog in the machine) an example of 
“compartmentalization,” in which she accepts the Dworkinian project of 
treating the making of our lives as a challenge that “we can perform well or 
badly,”70 but declines the challenge outside of the world of her loge?  Or does 
this splitting result from her conviction that the clandestine life of the mind is 
the most she can hope for given her social position, so that her inner life, in 
which she is living well, does not spill into a broader good life, which 
embraces morality? 
If Renée begins the novel as a hedgehog, in its solitary, defensive aspect, 
then the narrative arc of the novel pushes her toward unity and integrating the 
different domains of her life.  The arrival of the new tenant, Kakuro, disrupts 
the status quo of the building so that Renée and Paloma cannot continue their 
lives of concealment.  Commenting on the family of the former, now deceased, 
tenant whom Kakuro is replacing, Renée (a devoted reader of Leo Tolstoy’s 
novels) unthinkingly mutters, “You know, all happy families are alike . . . 
there’s nothing more to it,” leading Kakuro to give her an odd look and reply, 
“‘Every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.’”71  He then asks the name 
of Renée’s cat and, upon learning it is Leo, sends her a beautifully bound copy 
of Anna Karenina.72  His own cats are named Kitty and Levin (main characters 
from Tolstoy’s book).  
The rupture in Renée’s life is shattering as well as liberating.  For the first 
time in her life, she is truly seen by someone, first by Kakuro and then Paloma.  
In turn, Renée is able to discern that Paloma hides her true intelligence.  
Although Renée believes her class position makes her friendship with a 
wealthy and accomplished man like Kakuro impossible, they prove to be 
kindred spirits, with startlingly similar tastes in art, music, film, and literature.  
For the first time, she is willing to leave the fortress of her concealment. 
3. How Injustice – and Indignities – Might Produce a Hedgehog  
Justice is not an explicit focus of Barbery’s novel, but we might fruitfully 
ask whether injustice contributes to producing the hedgehog’s concealment.  
The problem of injustice is implicit in the novel’s disclosure of how class 
hierarchy, privilege, and prejudice prevent people from truly recognizing and 
seeing other people.  This seems to offend principles of the personal morality 
Dworkin advances: the first principle of dignity, self-respect, requires that, just 
 
70 Id. (manuscript at 11).    
71 BARBERY, supra note 1, at 135. 
72 Id. at 135, 173.  Renée’s love of Tolstoy novels provides another curious linkage 
between Berlin’s essay and Barbery’s novel.  Berlin originally subtitled his essay, “An 
Essay on Tolstoy’s View of History.”  ISAIAH BERLIN, THE HEDGEHOG AND THE FOX: AN 
ESSAY ON TOLSTOY’S VIEW OF HISTORY (1953).  It is to certain scenes in Anna Karenina that 
Renée’s mind turns at crucial times as she reflects on the meaning of life.  See BARBERY, 
supra note 1, at 122-24. 
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as we think it objectively important that our own life go well, we recognize it 
is also objectively important that other people’s lives go well.73  Renée’s 
childhood poverty also implicates questions of political morality – of equal 
concern and respect – to the extent it is an example of what Dworkin calls 
“unjust poverty.”74  These constraining background conditions have narrowed, 
though not completely determined, Renée’s sense of how she might live. 
Dworkin navigates the familiar tension between free will and determinism 
with a narrative view of life that fits with a person’s special responsibility to 
seek value in his or her life, rather than viewing actions as externally caused.75  
Renée’s narrative reveals a character who is an agent in her own life and yet 
has a deterministic view of her possibilities, due to constraining background 
conditions.  Throughout the novel, Renée’s poverty acts as the explanation for 
her solitary life as an autodidact and her concealment of that life.  A teacher’s 
pity and kindness in school opened her to the joys of the written word and she 
experiences a second birth – a hunger in her soul that she will assuage with 
books.  She rules out social interaction to share this joy because of her social 
position.76  Constraining background conditions limit her ability to feed her 
hunger through continuing formal education.  “At the age of twelve I left 
school and worked at home and in the fields alongside my parents and my 
brothers and sisters.  At seventeen I married.”77  This peaceful marriage, in 
which she is able to be herself, confounds her expectations of fate: “To be 
poor, ugly and, moreover, intelligent, condemns one, in our society, to a dark 
and disillusioned life, a condition one ought to accept at an early age.”78  Soon, 
she and her husband are concierges together.  “In the collective imagination,” 
she explains, married concierges are “a close-knit pair consisting of two 
entities so insignificant that only their union can make them apparent.”79  On 
this prejudiced view, the concierge couple “seems to be utterly devoid of such 
passions as love and desire” and, like the “totemic poodle” they are “expected 
to have,” “destined to remain ugly, stupid, submissive and boastful.”80 
Renée accepts, but resists, determinism.  Scornful of these demeaning class 
expectations, she caters to them by concealing her inner life.  This inner life is 
her form of resistance.  Thus, she tells the reader: 
[I]f, thus far, you have imagined that the ugliness of ageing and 
conciergely widowhood have made a pitiful wretch of me, resigned to the 
lowliness of her fate – then you are truly lacking in imagination.  I have 
 
73 DWORKIN, supra note 3 (manuscript at 156). 
74 Id. (manuscript at 160). 
75 Id. (manuscript at 144). 
76 BARBERY, supra note 1, at 45 (“[H]as one ever seen a girl raised in poverty penetrate 
the headiness of language deeply enough to share it with others?”). 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 47. 
79 Id. at 46. 
80 Id. 
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withdrawn, to be sure, and refuse to fight.  But within the safety of my 
own mind, there is no challenge I cannot accept.  I may be indigent in 
name, position, and appearance, but in my own mind I am an unrivalled 
goddess.81 
Thus, Renée fits Dworkin’s narrative view of life because she identifies and 
pursues value in her life; but the fact of her withdrawal to this domain, within 
which she is sovereign, implicitly raises questions of justice.  Her narrative 
indicts the social hierarchy that leads a concierge to believe her impoverished 
origins determine her low social position, which again seems to implicate 
Dworkin’s dignity principle that “it is objectively important that each human 
life, once begun, go well.”82  The problem of injustice is implicit in its 
disclosure of how class hierarchy, privilege, and prejudice prevent people from 
recognizing other people and seeing them accurately.  Through Renée’s daily 
interactions with residents of the building, who do not regard her as an equal 
but more as an embodied class stereotype, or even a “nonentity,”83 we see 
examples of failures in their personal morality, where dignitary principles 
require that each person should treat everyone’s life as objectively important.  
Indeed, Dworkin’s analysis of dignity and how certain relationships may 
threaten our dignity is particularly apt here.  In articulating responsibilities we 
have to others by virtue of various associative obligations, Dworkin argues that 
“[t]he practices that spawn our various role obligations are special in an 
important way: they pick out relationships that threaten indignity if they are 
not consolidated by love or at least heightened mutual concern: by a greater 
concern for one another than ethics and morality require for strangers.”84  He 
gives as “the most obvious examples . . . relationships of sexual or other forms 
of intimacy, of dependency, care and subordination, and of friendship and 
partnership.”85  I cannot offer a full evaluation of this approach here, but it 
seems a curious way to frame associational responsibility; its starting point is 
how relationships threaten our dignity, thus harming us, instead of how 
relationships help and sustain us.86   
 
81 Id. at 54. 
82 DWORKIN, supra note 3 (manuscript at 11). 
83 BARBERY, supra note 1, at 253. 
84 DWORKIN, supra note 3 (manuscript at 199). 
85 Id. 
86 By contrast, relational feminist thought and feminist philosophy about relational 
autonomy stress the vital importance of relationships to the development of self.  However, 
feminist analysis also recognizes the harms that relationships may produce and that someone 
who is vulnerable because of a relationship of dependency may be neglected, instead of 
receiving care and love, or, worse, be subject to abuse and domination.  See, e.g., ROBIN 
WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE 2 (1997); Linda C. McClain, The Liberal Future of Relational 
Feminism: Robin West’s Caring for Justice, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 477, 478 (1999) (book 
review).  An interesting commonality here between Dworkin’s and feminists’ analyses is 
that relationships may both foster and threaten dignity. 
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This focus on indignity is a useful lens to bring to bear on an examination of 
the relationships in the main characters’ lives in The Elegance of the 
Hedgehog.  For example, the lack of love and attention Renée experienced at 
home contributed to her limited sense of her possibilities.  A caring teacher 
launched her into a life of reading, but even so, Renée was harmed when she 
perceived this to be pity rather than genuine affection.  In her marital 
relationship, she found a life of some dignity.  Her many daily encounters that 
ensue because of her employment responsibility as a concierge present 
occasions for threats to her dignity.  However, she achieves a critical distance 
on these threats through her hedgehog strategy and by playing to class 
stereotypes.  Her narrative voice allows the reader to observe both how the 
way in which most residents treat her shows that they fail to honor dignitary 
principles in their personal morality, and how she maintains her dignity by 
critically reflecting on these lapses on their part.  Indeed, by focusing on 
Renée’s perception of these interactions, the likely readers of Barbery’s novel, 
who might identify in social class with the residents, may feel shamed by the 
residents’ behavior and become introspective about whether they exhibit a 
similar lack of concern or respect in their daily interactions.  
If these daily dealings are an affront to Renée’s dignity, then other 
relationships she forms affirm her dignity.  For example, because her 
friendship with Manuela, a woman who cleans apartments in Renée’s building, 
is one of mutual heightened concern, or even love, as Dworkin might reason, it 
confirms, rather than threatens, her dignity.  Her new relationship with Kakuro 
provides her the deepest opportunity to blossom; his respectful and then 
affectionate treatment starts to alter her own sense of her possibilities.  So too, 
her relationship with Paloma is one of mutual concern.  
Justice is also a concern of the novel if Renée’s childhood poverty was an 
example of what Dworkin calls “unjust poverty” that “cheat[s]” people of 
“opportunities and resources they are entitled to have.”87  Dworkin argues that 
“[o]ur foundational responsibility to make something valuable of our lives 
carries rights that others not deprive us of opportunities for success in that 
enterprise that we would otherwise have.”88  What social conditions, one might 
ask, led to Renée having to leave school at twelve to work with her family 
instead of pursuing an education and parlaying her passion for reading into a 
future profession?  In a world that followed Dworkin’s principles of 
distributional justice, for example, the resources with which she would start her 
life would be quite different. 
In a cathartic emotional scene with Paloma, she reveals a more traumatic 
reason for her sense of the impossibility of her friendship with Kakuro and for 
her sense of determinism and of the threat posed by rising above one’s social 
position: her beautiful older sister, Lisette, who left their impoverished village, 
was seduced, impregnated, and abandoned by a wealthy man, and came home 
 
87 DWORKIN, supra note 3 (manuscript at 160). 
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to give birth and die, followed soon by the death of her infant.  The horror of 
her sister’s plight has shaped Renée’s entire life, although she has never told 
anyone of it until she tells Paloma.  Until this moment, she had lived her life 
guided by the “two certainties” she derived from the tragedy of her sister’s 
death:  
[T]he strong live and the weak die, and their pleasure and suffering are 
proportionate to their position in the hierarchy.  Lisette had been beautiful 
and poor, I was intelligent and indigent, but like her I was doomed to a 
similar punishment if I ever sought to make good use of my mind in 
defiance of my class.  Finally, as I could not cease to be who I was, either, 
it became clear to me that my path would be one of secrecy: I had to keep 
silent about who I was, and never mix with that other world. 
 From being silent, I then became clandestine.89  
But after sharing this secret trauma with Paloma, Renée realizes she is 
willing to take a chance at friendship and that rebirth is possible.  A further 
catalyst is the moment when, at a birthday dinner for Kakuro (who has learned 
about Lisette from Paloma), Kakuro tells Renée: “[Y]ou are not your sister, we 
can be friends.  We can be anything we want to be.”90  Her solitary life – 
“spent in the clandestinity of a solitary mind” – “unravels.”91  This unraveling 
is also a rebirth – a recognition of new possibilities for living in the world in 
friendship or even something else.  To Renée, Kakuro is “a miraculous balm 
against all the certainties of fate.”92  The relevant point with respect to 
Dworkin’s framework is that Renée comes to realize that the narrative she has 
made of her life is premised on a mistaken belief about her possibilities.  This 
does not mean she has lived a bad life up to this point; as I explain, she has 
lived well subject to her sense of those possibilities and she has had genuine 
pleasures.  But she reaches a new understanding of what living well could be if 
she leaves her protective shell.  Renée’s transformation also reshapes Paloma’s 
sense of her own possible narrative path.93  Both these transformations seem 
compatible with Dworkin’s notion of life as having adverbial value. 
B. On Life’s Meaning and the Search for Truth 
One “foxy” cause that Justice for Hedgehogs tackles is skepticism about 
truth claims.  In particular, Dworkin rejects the tenability of a position of 
external skepticism about the possibility of moral judgments and argues that 
the only kind of skepticism that is possible is internal skepticism, which in 
 
89 BARBERY, supra note 1, at 288. 
90 Id. at 309. 
91 Id. at 311. 
92 Id. at 319. 
93 Id. at 289 (“Madame Michele . . . you know, you are giving me hope again . . . .  [I]t 
seems it might be possible to change one’s fate after all.”). 
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itself is a kind of moral judgment.94  As described above, Dworkin 
distinguishes the kind of truth that is available through scientific inquiry from 
that available from inquiry into values.  While scientific propositions can be 
“barely true,” and one’s motive in seeking to discover truth is irrelevant, 
inquiries into value depend critically on argument and interpretation.  It is not a 
matter of discovering universal moral particles that are just “out there.”  Nor, 
on what Dworkin calls “Hume’s principle,” do facts about the world or about 
the phenomenon of morality – whether from sociology, primatology, or 
political science – prove moral claims: “[Y]ou cannot derive a statement about 
what ‘ought’ or ‘ought not’ to be from any account, no matter how detailed, of 
what just ‘is.’”95  Moreover, Dworkin recognizes that some people look to the 
existence of a god or to divine revelation as the source of truth for moral 
claims, but his is emphatically not a model resting on divine revelation.  
Rather, the “truth about morality just is what the best case shows.”96  
The “epistemology of a morally responsible person is interpretive.”97  
Indeed, interpretation plays a key role both in achieving integrity in the 
interpretive process – be it of a legal text, a work of literature, or of art – and in 
achieving integrity in one’s life as one reasons about ethics and morality.98  
Thus, there are two interpretive projects going on in Dworkin’s book: (1) the 
interpretation of texts, or finding truth in texts or art; and (2) the development 
of moral personality through conceptual interpretation, or interpreting, through 
the responsibility project, what principles of authenticity and self-respect 
require in our lives.  Dworkin posits common features in each process: just as 
persons participating in an interpretive community, such as literary scholars, 
share a package of purposes, so “[p]eople share an interpretive moral or 
political concept when they take themselves to participate in a collective 
practice in which the concept functions as deploying an alleged or prima facie 
value or disvalue.”99  Here, Dworkin posits value holism at the level of 
principles.  He acknowledges considerable variation or disagreement at the 
level of application: “Sharing an interpretive concept is consistent with very 
great and entirely intractable divergence of opinion about instances.”100  How, 
then, do the hedgehog and fox differ?  As in his other writings, Dworkin aims 
to identify shared concepts even amidst intense disagreement.  Thus, the 
 
94 DWORKIN, supra note 3 (manuscript at 17-63).  Describing and evaluating Dworkin’s 
arguments about forms of skepticism are tasks outside the scope of this Article.  As a law 
professor, not a trained philosopher, I leave that task to others, including participants in this 
Symposium.  My purpose in noting them is to relate them to the skepticism of the main 
characters in The Elegance of the Hedgehog. 
95 Id. (manuscript at 19). 
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hedgehog insists that those who disagree share a single interpretive concept – 
for example, justice – and disagree about its fundamental character; the fox 
does not believe there is a shared concept.101 
How does the search for meaning and truth feature in The Elegance of the 
Hedgehog?  Are its central characters participants in interpretive communities?  
What is their assessment of nature and religion, for example, as sources of 
moral truths?  As the novel opens, both Renée and Paloma are skeptical about 
whether life has meaning.  Indeed, they believe that others are caught up in 
illusions that life’s meaning is simple and readily decipherable.102  They also 
believe that much of human endeavor futilely seeks to evade human nature’s 
basic roots in the imperatives of primates.  In this regard, while they might 
agree with Dworkin on Hume’s principle, they seem to part from Dworkin in 
giving nature more weight as a factor shaping our ethical and moral 
possibilities.  Like Dworkin, they eschew religious revelation as a clear avenue 
to truth.  
In Renée’s view, the class hierarchy with its attendant social prejudices is a 
way that the residents of the hotel find meaning in life – in a concierge living 
up – or, rather, down – to social expectations.  She refers to herself as a “cog” 
that helps turn “the great universal illusion” that “life has a meaning that can 
be easily deciphered.”103  Nonetheless, Renée herself has a coherent 
worldview, even if her starting position and the constraints of her class 
background and education lead her to make incorrect conclusions about the 
possibility of a deeper engagement with the world.  She does not take a 
position of “global internal skepticism” – the view that life itself “has no value 
or meaning and . . . no value of any other kind can survive this dismal 
conclusion.”104  She believes that both nature and art have meaning and lead 
humans to moments of timelessness.  Her worldview includes both a 
determinist view of class hierarchy and the conviction that humanity’s basic 
challenge is to curb primate aggression through education and civilization.  For 
example, as a girl, she was “convinced early on of the pointlessness” of her 
own existence, but because of her education resisted the resort to “the violence 
inherent in [the human] condition.”105  School constituted a second birth, 
making her a “most civilized human being”: “When the struggle to dominate 
our primate aggressiveness takes up arms as powerful as books and words, the 
undertaking is an easy one.”106 
The beauty of nature and the beauty captured in art serve to counter, or at 
least contain, natural impulses.  For Renée, this is manifest in the image of the 
camellia on moss, from a film by the Japanese director Ozu (a distant relative, 
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she learns later, of Kakuro’s).107  In the film, one character, contemplating “the 
camellia against the moss,” says: “True novelty is that which does not grow 
old, despite the passage of time.”108  Renée speculates that these scenes are so 
moving because the “sudden flowering of pure beauty at the heart of 
ephemeral passion” is something “we all aspire to,” but do not know how to 
attain: “The contemplation of eternity within the very movement of life.”109 
Renée describes herself as “a very camellia-on-moss sort of person” – 
although in her encounters with rude tenants, she retaliates in ways that are 
“[n]ot so very camellia-on-moss after all.”110  She opines: 
For primates we have been and primates we shall remain, however often 
we learn to find joy in a camellia on moss.  This is the very purpose of 
education . . . .  One must offer camellias on moss, tirelessly, in order to 
escape the natural impulses of our species, because those impulses do not 
change, and continually threaten the fragile equilibrium of survival.111 
The camellia on moss plays a key role throughout the novel.  In the courtyard 
of Renée’s building, she has planted camellias, which she tends.  These 
camellias – and Renée’s mindfulness of them – play a role in saving the life of 
the drug-addicted son of a tenant, who later, when recovered, comes to see 
Renée.  He tells her, “when [he] was so bad off, [he] would think about those 
flowers, and it did [him] good.”112  Renée observes, “[A] camellia can change 
fate.”113 
The other main voice in the novel belongs to Paloma, who is also skeptical 
of life’s meaning.  At the book’s beginning, Paloma, age twelve and 
“exceptionally intelligent,” has formulated a plan to take her life and set her 
family’s apartment on fire by her thirteenth birthday.  Why?  She has 
discerned, already, that “life is absurd.”114  On first meeting, she seems to 
represent what Dworkin calls “global internal skepticism.”115  This is a 
“despairing form of skepticism,” he argues, which “finds us alone at night 
when we can almost touch our own death, the terrifying sense that nothing 
matters.  Argument can’t help then; we can only wait for dawn.”116  However, 
Paloma does not seem terrified so much as resigned and clear-eyed.  In her 
view, the problem is that children are deceived by adults, who tell them the 
“universal lie that everyone is supposed to believe:” “Life has meaning and we 
 
107 Id. at 101. 
108 Id. at 100. 
109 Id. at 100-01. 
110 Id. at 108. 
111 Id. at 107. 
112 Id. at 294. 
113 Id. at 295. 
114 Id. at 23. 
115 DWORKIN, supra note 3 (manuscript at 58). 
116 Id. (manuscript at 63). 
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grown-ups know what it is.”117  But “once you become an adult and you realize 
that’s not true, it’s too late.”118  She, by contrast, understands that “the final 
destination is the goldfish bowl.”119  She wants to end her life because 
although she can now perceive that “life is a farce,” she fears she will lose this 
perception if she becomes an adult: 
We are, basically, programmed to believe in something that doesn’t exist, 
because we are living creatures; we don’t want to suffer.  So we spend all 
our energy persuading ourselves that there are things that are worthwhile 
and that that is why life has meaning.  I may be very intelligent, but I 
don’t know how much longer I’m going to be able to struggle against this 
biological tendency.120 
She plans to set her parents’ apartment on fire because her parents and older 
sister think they are swimming in the ocean, not the goldfish bowl, because 
they live in a four thousand square foot apartment with “piles of furniture and 
paintings.”121 
Paloma, like Renée, reflects on the fact that humans are animals.  She feels 
an affinity to all living creatures: “[l]iving, eating, reproducing, fulfilling the 
task for which we were born, and dying: it has no meaning, true, but that’s the 
way things are.”122  Scrutinizing the lives of her family and their friends, she 
discerns various dead-ends, or pathways that evade, in Dworkin’s terms, a 
responsibility project.  Her mother, for example, speaks incessantly about 
insights gained from her almost-daily psychoanalysis, takes numerous sleeping 
pills, and devotes herself to watering her plants and talking to her cats.123  
Paloma sees through the way in which her father aims at a mode of being that 
compounds stereotypes (“very serious Minister of the Republic” coupled with 
“Mr.-Nice-Guy-all-the-same who likes his cold beer”124). 
If these are the starting positions of Renée and Paloma, then have they given 
up any effort to find meaning in life?  Do they think there is such a thing, for 
example, as knowable truth?  Are they seeking value holism, to use Dworkin’s 
term?  They are both engaged in quests.  Why, otherwise, does Renée devote 
herself so intensely to the life of a solitary autodidact?  She finds pleasure and 
moments of transcendence and, arguably, meaning in literature, music, and art, 
as well as in the beauty of nature itself. 
 
117 BARBERY, supra note 1, at 22. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 23.  Paloma refers here to a haiku she formulates: “Follow the stars/In the 
goldfish bowl/An end.”  Id.  Paloma expresses each of her “Profound Thoughts” in the form 
of a Japanese poem, either haiku (three lines) or tanka (five lines).  Id. at 26. 
120 Id. at 24. 
121 Id. at 27. 
122 Id. at 238. 
123 Id. at 51-52, 78-79, 166-67. 
124 Id. at 38. 
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Paloma gives herself an important self-assignment (to use a term from 
Dworkin’s earlier work on the challenge model of ethics125) and accepts 
personal responsibility for living her life well, subject to her exit plan.  
Although she plans to end her life, she also has a commitment to keeping two 
journals, one of “Profound Thoughts,” which she sums up each time with a 
poem, and one on the “Movement of the World,” which she devotes to “the 
movement of people, bodies, or even – if there’s really nothing to say – things, 
and to finding whatever is beautiful enough to give life meaning.”126  She 
states that if she finds something – “a body with beautiful movement or, failing 
that, a beautiful idea for the mind,” she may “rethink [her] options” and decide 
“that life is worth living after all.”127  Thus, she is not a skeptic in the sense 
that she is open to finding meaning, even asking Renée at one point, “do you 
believe that life has meaning?”128 
1. Why Art Matters 
Both Justice for Hedgehogs and The Elegance of the Hedgehog consider the 
role art plays in human life and in discerning life’s meaning.  As noted above, 
Dworkin draws frequent analogies between life and art.  He describes life as a 
performance, writing of “rising to the challenge of having a life to lead.”129  
Dworkin finds instructive “the Romantic’s analogy between value in living and 
in art,” and stresses the “performance value” of both a work of art and a life 
lived well.130 
What role does art play in Renée’s worldview?  Human endeavor seems, at 
times, an unsuccessful construction that tries to deny and yet is inevitably built 
upon the edifice of humanity’s basic primate nature.  She explains: “we spend 
most of our time maintaining and defending our territory, so that it will protect 
and gratify us,” using our energy in the “quest for territory, hierarchy, and sex 
that gives life to our conatus.”131  But at times, humans gain consciousness of 
“how much vitality is required simply to support our primitive requirements,” 
and wonder, “bewildered, where Art fits in.”132  All this posturing seems 
vanity, and “eternity eludes us.”133  Higher learning seems to “founder” on “the 
altar of our true nature”; society, “a territorial field mined with the powerful 
charges of hierarchy, is sinking into the nothingness of Meaning.”134  In effect, 
 
125 Ronald Dworkin, Foundations on Liberal Equality, in 11 THE TANNER LECTURES ON 
HUMAN VALUES 1 (Grethe B. Peterson ed., 1990). 
126 BARBERY, supra note 1, at 38. 
127 Id. at 37-38. 
128 Id. at 268. 
129 DWORKIN, supra note 3 (manuscript at 124). 
130 Id. at 125. 
131 BARBERY, supra note 1, at 97.   
132 Id. at 97. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 98. 
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this truth about human beings’ true nature threatens to topple or prove 
meaningless all of human endeavor.  “At times like this,” Renée writes, “you 
desperately need Art”: 
You seek to reconnect with your spiritual illusions, and you wish 
fervently that something might rescue you from your biological destiny, 
so that all poetry and grandeur will not be cast out from the world. 
Thus, to withdraw as far as you can from the jousting and combat that 
are the appanages of our warrior species, you drink a cup of tea, or 
perhaps you watch a film by Ozu, and place upon this sorry theater the 
seal of Art and its greatest treasures.135 
Dworkin also refers to humans’ animal nature, particularly in arguing that it 
is “adverbial value” – not “adjectival value” – that is the kind of value found in 
a life lived well.  But while Renée seems to view humans as desperately 
seeking to escape biological destiny, which is, almost, a rebuke to the human 
quest for meaning, Dworkin focuses on the constraints of nature primarily as 
presenting us with the challenge of living well in the face of “inevitable 
death.”136  
While Renée may not take the world of human self-deception too seriously, 
she does take her life seriously.  Does her life have adverbial value?  On the 
one hand, Renée is steadfast in the conviction that her impoverished 
beginnings and the nothingness of her family’s home life determine that she 
cannot interact in an open way with others nor fight a foreordained lowly place 
in the class hierarchy.  On the other hand, her rebellion against her fate comes 
in the form of her pleasure in the solitary life of the mind.  As she tells the 
reader who might assume she is a pitiful wretch because of her poverty: 
“within the safety of my own mind, there is no challenge I cannot accept . . . .  
I am an unrivalled goddess.”137 
Barbery frequently uses the language of divinity and aristocracy to describe 
the conception that Renée has of herself and of her small, and ultimately 
expanded, circle of intimates.  In a sense, this is not merely the life against 
death sort of struggle for meaning Dworkin contemplates, but a life lived in 
partial defiance of class prejudices, with a reversal of values such that the 
seemingly lowly are exalted in a special world of their own making.  One way 
that Renée gives her life adverbial value is through a system – or ethics – of 
personal friendship that embraces a different system of value than the 
surrounding world.138  In this way, she finds dignity – rather than indignity – in 
 
135 Id.   
136 See Dworkin, supra note 3 (manuscript at 11); supra Part II.A.1. 
137 BARBERY, supra note 1, at 54. 
138 One might see parallels between this inversion of values and Nietzsche’s idea of the 
transvaluation of values.  However, Nietzsche was contemptuous of the resulting “slave 
morality,” as evidenced in FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALITY (Keith 
Ansell Pearson ed., Carol Diethe trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2007) (1887).  Barbery, by 
contrast, makes Renée’s perspective on the world more sympathetic than that of her 
  
886 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:863 
 
this subset of her daily associations with others.  For example, as the novel 
begins, Renée’s only friend is Manuela, “a simple woman,” whose twenty 
years “wasted stalking dust in other people’s homes has in no way robbed her 
of elegance.”139  Renée describes Manuela as a true aristocrat, a woman who is 
“never sullied by vulgarity, although she may be surrounded by it.”140  In 
Manuela’s case, this vulgarity includes: 
the vulgarity of her in-laws, who with their loud laughter muffle the pain 
of being born weak and without prospects; the vulgarity of an 
environment as bleakly desolate as the neon lights of the factory where 
the men go each morning, like sinners returning to hell; then, the 
vulgarity of her employers who, for all their money, cannot hide their 
own baseness and who speak to her the way they would a mangy dog 
covered with oozing bald patches.141 
Renée and Manuela share an elegance and dignity of a life lived in defiance of 
social expectation: “Just as I am a permanent traitor to my archetype,” 
Manuela “is a felon oblivious of her condition.”142  Renée details the many 
constraints of Manuela’s circumstances, including child labor, early marriage, 
and exile from Portugal to France, where society looks upon her children as 
“thoroughly Portugese” even though they are French by birthright.143 
Through their ritual of having tea and sharing special foods, beautifully 
prepared and wrapped by Manuela, Renée is transformed, twice a week, into “a 
clandestine monarch.”144  When Kakuro meets Renée, he quickly suspects she 
is “a clandestine erudite princess.”145  When he meets Manuela, he concurs 
with Renée’s assessment that she is “a great woman, an aristocrat.”146  When 
Paloma needs a space just to have peace and quiet, Renée allows her to spend 
time in her loge.  When Paloma has tea and conversation with Manuela, 
Kakuro, and Renée, Renée labels her “a true little princess among high-ranking 
party members.”147  In this way, Renée might seem to live her life as a work of 
art, finding art and elegance in simple but beautiful rituals and in friendships. 
Art also plays a key role in Paloma’s growing consciousness.  Paloma’s 
worldview has several parallels to Renée’s with respect to human illusions, to 
efforts to evade our basic animal nature, and to the transcendent role of art.  
She states early on: “[I]f I had more time to live, Art would be my whole life. . 
 
“betters.”  The discerning person perceives royalty and divinity where others see inferiority 
and insignificance. 
139 BARBERY, supra note 1, at 31. 
140 Id. at 32. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. at 32-33. 
145 Id. at 144. 
146 Id. at 227. 
147 Id. at 267. 
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. .  I’m not just talking about great works of art by great masters. . . .  No, I’m 
referring to the beauty that is there in the world, things that, being part of the 
movement of life, elevate us.”148  As noted above, she commits to keeping a 
journal of such movements that may lead her to reconsider her plan to end her 
life. 
2. Art, Interpretation, and Access to Truth 
Renée, in Dworkin’s terms, does seem to accept what Dworkin identifies as 
a special responsibility to identify and find value in her life.  “Art,” broadly 
defined, is a central way that she finds value.  In her loge, she pursues an 
ambitious program of reading.  If a book or idea stumps her, she persists until 
she masters it or concludes it is not worth knowing.  Here is a flavor of how 
seriously she takes her quest.  In Renée’s words: “Edmund Husserl . . . has 
been threatening the stability of my private Mount Olympus. . . .  
Phenomenology is beyond my reach and that I cannot bear.”149  Thus, she 
devotes weeks of time and trips to the library to figure it out, before she 
ultimately concludes that “phenomenology is a fraud.”150  To discern what 
work is worthwhile, she submits it to the cherry plum test: if, as she eats a 
cherry plum, she can concentrate both on the work and the plum – “[i]f each 
resists the powerful onslaught of the other” – the work passes the test.151  
Kant’s works, for example, pass this test “with flying colors.”152  
Phenomenology fails this test.153 
Perhaps the author included this cherry plum test to poke a bit of fun at 
philosophy, since she herself was a student of philosophy, and ultimately found 
literature more rewarding.154  But the immediacy of this test does invite 
attention to how, in the novel, the protagonists believe it is possible to discover 
truth.  In Dworkin’s account, we must “earn” the right to our value holism 
through argument and principled interpretation.  Juxtaposed with this arduous 
process, the cherry plum test is obviously visceral and sensation-based. 
 
148 Id. at 37-38. 
149 Id. at 54-55. 
150 Id. at 58. 
151 Id. at 55. 
152 Id. at 54-55. 
153 Id. at 58.  Why?  For one thing, phenomenology finds “ontological dignity” in our 
“reflective consciousness,” “the only entity we have that is worth studying, for it saves us 
from biological determinism.”  Id. at 59.  But she concludes: “No one seems aware of the 
fact that, since we are animals subject to the cold determinism of physical things, all of the 
foregoing is null and void.”  Id.  
154 Interview by Laura Lamanda with Muriel Barbery (Aug. 25, 2007), available at 
http://www.bookbrowse.com/author_interviews/full/index.cfm?author_number=1656 (“I 
followed a long, boring course of studies in philosophy.  I expected it to help me understand 
better that which surrounds me: but it didn’t work out that way.  Literature has taught me 
more.”). 
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But our narrator’s intellectual quest does include more than reading while 
eating cherry plums.  Dworkin’s framework would have us ask whether Renée 
is part of an interpretive community.  An autodidact, she says, has a 
“combination of ability and blindness.”155  “Deprived of the steady guiding 
hand that any good education provides, the autodidact possesses nonetheless 
the gift of freedom and conciseness of thought, where official discourse would 
put up barriers and prohibit adventure.”156  Renée’s ability to carve out for 
herself a domain of beauty and meaning in defiance of her class origins also 
suggests a rupture in interpretation – how, after all, is consciousness possible?  
Is not her life of the mind in contradiction to expectations?  Her narrative has 
the power to disrupt expectations.157 
Renée’s ability to critique her surroundings and come to consciousness that 
more than her class-determined life is possible is reminiscent of Catharine 
MacKinnon’s reflections on how it is possible for women to gain 
consciousness, given that patriarchy is a nearly perfect metaphysical system.158  
But Renée is not a rebel or a radical in terms of fundamentally rejecting the 
canon or offering a radically different interpretation of Tolstoy or Mozart or 
Kant.  By contrast, feminist theorists in political science have offered trenchant 
readings of the sex inequality permeating classic works in political thought,159 
just as feminist legal theorists and litigators have exposed the sex inequality in 
mainstream bodies of law, such as family law and criminal law, and critiqued 
and unmasked the gendered assumptions of doctrines of equality, liberty, and 
privacy.160  Dworkin refers at a few points to critical schools of interpretation 
 
155 BARBERY, supra note 1, at 53. 
156 Id. 
157 Including those of the author.  Evidently, one catalyst for this book was an 
observation by Barbery’s editor.  In her previous book, Gourmet Rhapsody, Barbery had 
Renée speaking “in a way that was extremely crude, stereotypical,” “a caricature of a 
concierge,” but her editor observed: “You’re a novelist, anything is possible; your concierge 
could just as well express herself like the Duchess of Guermantes.”  Interview by Elizabeth 
Floyd Mair with Muriel Barbery (Apr. 24, 2009), available at http://blog.timesunion.com/ 
books/interview-with-muriel-barbery/1349. 
158 See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward 
Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 638 (1983). 
159 See, e.g., SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, WOMEN IN WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT (1979); 
CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT (1988). 
160 One example is the Equal Protection litigation pioneered by Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 
which persuaded the Supreme Court that gender-based differentiation between citizens 
should receive intermediate scrutiny and be based on an “exceedingly persuasive 
justification.”  See Justice Ginsburg’s account of this standard in United States v. Virginia, 
518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996).  For just a few of the many pioneering works in feminist legal 
theory on these issues, see FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY (Frances E. Olsen ed., 1995); MARTHA 
ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY (1991); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, 
TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1990); MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE 
DIFFERENCE (1990); Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 
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(including feminism) that, among other things, point out limitations of existing 
premises of interpretation, such as sexism.161  
In contrast, by allowing herself access to great art, by being moved by it, 
and by being able to explain why great art moves us, Renée is admitting herself 
to what Dworkin calls a “collaborative” enterprise of interpretation from which 
she assumes people believe her class origins exclude her.162  In literature and 
art, Dworkin contends, the author or artist “has begun a project that the 
interpreter tries to advance.”163  This is collaborative interpretation because the 
readers or viewers “take themselves to be partners in an act initiated by a 
speaker or writer”; they share a goal: “successful communication of what the 
[speaker or writer] sought to communicate.”164  As he further explains, the 
value account of interpretation relates two questions: “what does some object – 
a law or a poem or a painting – mean,” and “what kind of value does that 
object have, in itself or for us?”165  These are exactly the kind of questions 
Renée takes up in her disquisitions about art, as I elaborate below.  In contrast 
to a person Dworkin imagines who just “sees” something in a painting or text, 
but cannot explain it, Renée can and does offer accounts of the role of art and 
why particular art moves us.  Later, when Renée forms her friendship with 
Kakuro, they seem to find the same pleasure in certain passages from Anna 
Karenina and be similarly moved by a still life and by scenes from Ozu 
films.166  This suggests they share in an interpretive community. 
Both Renée and Paloma find that “Art” allows for the experience of 
timelessness.167  The camellias on the moss in the Ozu film are one example.  
In a sense, both heroines seem to believe there is a kind of truth to which Art 
and sometimes nature provide at least temporary access.  In this sense, they are 
not internal or external skeptics within Dworkin’s framework.  But their notion 
of sudden glimpses or access may put them at odds with Dworkin’s notion of 
“earning” a right to truth.  Dworkin observes that the “active holism of 
interpretation means . . . that there is no firm ground at all, that even when our 
interpretive convictions seem inescapable, when we think there really is 
 
955 (1984); Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1279 
(1987). 
161 DWORKIN, supra note 3 (manuscript at 90-91).  I am not taking up this aspect of 
Dworkin’s book in this Article.  He gives an odd example of feminist critiques of Disney 
and popular culture for sex stereotyping, but his basic point seems sound: feminist critical 
interpretations aim to expose “sexist roots and hidden influences” in popular culture.  Id. 
(manuscript at 92).  Dworkin previously noted the advent of feminist interpretation and 
criticism in A Matter of Principle.  See DWORKIN, supra note 17, at 165. 
162 DWORKIN, supra note 3 (manuscript at 87). 
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. (manuscript at 86). 
166 BARBERY, supra note 1, at 198-99. 
167 Id. at 203-04.  The use, in text, of Art with an initial capital letter reflects the usage by 
Renée and Paloma when they speak about art’s meaning or role. 
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nothing else to think, we are still stalked by the ineffability of conviction.”168  
Anything more, we must earn through arguments: “[E]verything depends on 
what we actually and responsibly think.  Not because our thinking makes it 
right but because, in thinking it right, we think it right.”169 
Is this sense of timelessness akin to the “ineffability” of conviction?  Or 
might it be analogized to an experience of value holism, or a basic unity of 
values?  A few examples may help with our examination.  As a child, Renée 
was enchanted by watching snow fall inside a little glass globe.  This mystery 
entailed a sense of timelessness: 
I was not yet seven years old, but I already knew that the measured drift 
of the little cottony particles foreshadowed what the heart would feel in 
moments of great joy.  Time slowing, expanding, a lingering graceful 
ballet, and when the last snowflake has come to rest, we know we have 
experienced a suspension of time that is the sign of a great illumination.  
As a child I often wondered whether I would be allowed to live such 
moments – to inhabit the slow, majestic ballet of the snowflakes, to be 
released at last from the dreary frenzy of time.170 
Paloma also experiences such special moments out of time.  In her journal, 
“The Movement of the World,” she reports that, when the acclaimed school 
choir performs, she experiences it as a miracle that “diffuses the ugliness of 
everyday life into a spirit of perfect communion.”171  She feels part of “a 
sublime whole, to which the others also belong,” and pauses to reflect: “I 
wonder why such things cannot be the rule of everyday life, instead of being an 
exceptional moment.”172 
This emphasis on art’s meaning as providing glimpses of timelessness 
suggests that we gain access to truth through momentary intuition or 
illumination.  However, Renée does not find such moments ineffable; she can 
– and does – offer an interpretation of those moments.  Her longest disquisition 
on art and timelessness comes when she encounters a copy of a still life by 
Pieter Claesz in Kakuro’s apartment and ponders “the sense of wonder we 
perceive when we encounter certain works of art.”173  What explains the 
enigma that “great works are the visual forms which attain in us the certainty 
of timeless consonance”?174  The “congruence” she finds that links great works 
of art is that, “despite the insignificance and ephemeral nature of lives always 
doomed to belong to one era and one culture alone,” “the genius of great artists 
penetrates to the heart of the mystery and exhumes, under various guises, the 
 
168 DWORKIN, supra note 3 (manuscript at 100). 
169 Id. 
170 BARBERY, supra note 1, at 178. 
171 Id. at 185. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. at 201. 
174 Id. 
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same sublime form that we seek in all artistic production.”175  The still life in 
question thus “achieves the universal in the singular: the timeless nature of the 
consonant form.”176  Using Dworkin’s framework, we might suggest a parallel 
between the experience of timelessness and unity and that of value holism. 
The “purpose of Art,” with a capital A, Renée theorizes, is “to give us the 
brief, dazzling illusion of the camellia, carving from time an emotional 
aperture that cannot be reduced to animal logic.”177  Here Renée’s view 
resembles Dworkin’s notion of art – and life – as performance, lived out in the 
shadow of nature.  For Renée, this is laced with a dose of pessimism about the 
toll of everyday life and its projects.  Art “gives shape to our emotions, makes 
them visible and, in so doing, places a seal of eternity upon them,” because 
particular works of art “have incarnated the universal nature of human 
emotions.”178  This stands in contrast to “the tumult and boredom of everyday 
life – itself an unceasing and futile pursuit, consumed by projects.”  In the 
framed painting lies “the plenitude of a suspended moment, stolen from time, 
rescued from human longing.”179  Again, Renée speaks of the futility of human 
endeavors: daily life is a battlefield and we are exhausted by desires for what 
we cannot have.180  Art provides the pleasure of someone else’s project, born 
of someone else’s desire, of something offered without “the effort of desiring 
on our part.”181  In the still life, then, is the “quintessence of Art,” or “the 
certainty of timelessness”: “In the scene before our eyes – silent, without life 
or motion – a time exempt of projects is incarnated, perfection purloined from 
duration and its weary greed – pleasure without desire, existence without 
duration, beauty without will.”182  
 
175 Id. at 201-02. 
176 Id. at 202. 
177 Id. at 203.   
178 Id. 
179 Id. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. at 204. 
182 Id.  Renée and Paloma’s ruminations on time and timelessness may evoke, for some 
readers, T.S. Eliot’s The Four Quartets.  See T.S. ELIOT, THE COMPLETE POEMS AND PLAYS, 
1909-1950, at 117-45 (1952).  Admittedly, Renée and Paloma disavow religious belief, 
while The Four Quartets is replete with Christian symbolism and deep theological allusions.  
Despite these differences, both texts address timelessness.  The first quartet, “Burnt 
Norton,” begins with a reflection on time and speaks of “the still point of the turning world.”  
Id. at 119.  Eliot writes of the burden of daily time – of the “time-ridden faces/Distracted 
from distraction by distraction/Filled with fancies and empty of meaning/Tumid apathy with 
no concentration.”  Id. at 120.  Compare, here, Renée’s picture of the “unceasing and futile 
pursuit” of everyday life and its “projects.”  BARBERY, supra note 1, at 203.  In the final part 
of Eliot’s first quartet, he writes of the stillness of a Chinese jar and of a violin.  ELIOT, 
supra, at 121.  Eliot, like Renée and Paloma, was attracted to Asian philosophy and 
aesthetics.  He writes of the sudden intimation or illumination of timelessness, of the 
fleeting moment: “Quick now, here, now, always – Ridiculous the waste sad time/Stretching 
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Later, Renée further ruminates on art and timelessness when she stealthily 
reads the graduate thesis on William of Ockham by Paloma’s sister, Colombe.  
She is dismayed by how Colombe squandered an opportunity to take up the 
“enthralling” question: “Do universals exist, or only singular things?”183  Just 
as “[i]n every table there is an essence that gives it its form and, similarly, 
every work of art belongs to a universal form that alone confers its seal upon 
the work.”184  One can only see a particular table or a particular painting, not 
the “universal ‘table’ form,” but the individual painting “is an incarnation of 
Beauty, a dazzling apparition that we can only contemplate through the 
singular, but that opens a tiny window onto eternity and the timelessness of a 
sublime form.”185  
Friendship, Renée comes to learn as she watches an Ozu film with Kakuro, 
also can accord “moments of bliss,” of “this pause in time, within time.”186  
Moreover, when friends can share as part of a collaborative interpretive 
community, they can appreciate together the timelessness of art.  A poignant 
illustration of this comes when Kakuro and Paloma are united later in a 
moment of sadness over Renée’s unexpected death in an auto accident.  They 
suddenly hear the music of Satie drifting into the courtyard, and they both 
“took a deep breath and let the sun warm [their] faces while [they] listened to 
the music drifting down from above.”187  Paloma agrees, when Kakuro 
observes, “I think Renée would have liked this moment,” but she is not sure 
why, until she reflects on it later: 
I have finally concluded, maybe that’s what life is about: there’s a lot of 
despair, but also the odd moment of beauty, where time is no longer the 
same.  It’s as if those strains of music created a sort of interlude in time, 
something suspended, an elsewhere that had come to us, an always within 
never.188 
The novel ends with this poignant declaration by Paloma: “Don’t worry Renée, 
I won’t commit suicide and I won’t burn a thing.  Because from now on, for 
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you, I’ll be searching for those moments of always within never.  Beauty, in 
this world.”189  
C. Design for Living – On the Responsibility for Living a Good Life and 
Living Well 
Renée would probably say, with some justification, that she lives well 
subject to the constraints of her origins.  Dworkin writes, for example, that the 
goodness of one’s life depends on luck and circumstances, and one can have 
the bad moral luck to be born into circumstances of great poverty.190  Of the 
stunting effects of poverty, Renée writes of her home life and her parents’ 
inability to display affection or emotion: “Poverty is a reaper: it harvests 
everything inside us that might have made us capable of social intercourse with 
others, and leaves us empty, purged of feeling, so that we may endure all the 
darkness of the present day.”191  We might usefully recall here Dworkin’s point 
about how our everyday associations, particularly in the realm of intimate life, 
can threaten our dignity.  Renée embraces fate to the degree of not attempting 
genuine social interaction across class lines, but she is a goddess within her 
domain.  
Her personal ethics (or living well) is manifest in her clandestine intellectual 
life.  Her personal morality (or living a good life) is manifest in her marriage 
(while her husband was alive) and in the few friendships she allows herself.  
For example, with Manuela, even if she cannot fully be herself, she 
experiences mutual respect and devotion.  Her personal morality is also evident 
in her daily devotion to her cat and solicitude for the other animals in the 
building.  She is also solicitous of a local homeless person and the drug-
addicted young man who later tells her he was saved by the camellias.  At the 
same time, she is polite, but not friendly, to the residents she serves.  She 
finally finds true communion in her friendship with Kakuro. 
Renée also espouses a personal moral responsibility, or obligation, 
incumbent on society’s elite, proclaiming that, “[p]rivilege brings with it true 
obligations”: “If you belong to the closed inner sanctum of the elite, you must 
serve in equal proportion to the glory and ease of material existence you derive 
from belonging to that inner sanctum.”192  She describes, for example, what 
she would do if she, like Colombe, had the privilege of attending a prestigious 
university: 
I would dedicate myself to the progress of Humanity, with resolving 
issues that are crucial for the survival, well-being and elevation of 
mankind, with the fate of Beauty in the world, or with the just crusade for 
philosophical authenticity.  It’s not a calling, there are choices, the field is 
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wide. . . .  Should you devote your time to teaching, to producing a body 
of work, to research, to Culture?  It makes no difference.  The only thing 
that matters is your intention: are you elevating thought and contributing 
to the common good, or rather joining the ranks in a field of study whose 
only purpose is its own perpetuation, and only function the self-
reproduction of a sterile elite – for this turns the university into a sect.193 
Along these lines, she concludes that Colombe should have learned from her 
medieval studies of William of Ockham that “[t]ruth loves nothing better than 
the simplicity of truth,” but instead, “all she seems to have gleaned from her 
studies is how to make a conceptual fuss in the service of nothing.”194  This 
leads her to further reflections on the role of intellectual inquiry and of art.  
Responsible intellectual pursuit “remains a necessity that does not depart from 
animality,” for the mission of literature, “like any form of Art,” is “to make the 
fulfillment of our essential duties more bearable.”195  Again, the animality of 
human beings features in her worldview: Art is a “weapon for survival” 
provided to “a creature like man, who must forge his destiny by means of 
thought and reflexivity;” for “something has to make our own wisdom 
bearable, something has to save us from the woeful eternal fever of biological 
destiny.”196  A parallel to Dworkin’s book is the emphasis on human agency, 
on effort in the face of animal nature, although – perhaps because of Hume’s 
principle – biological destiny weighs less heavily in Dworkin’s worldview.  
Dworkin stresses the significance of constructing meaning through offering the 
best interpretation.  There is no easy “right answer,” but an ongoing process of 
(and responsibility for) reasoning.  Might she agree with Dworkin’s idea that 
philosophers have a special responsibility to do the “lion’s share” of work in 
helping to develop networks of value, which may be of service to persons 
engaged in reflection upon their values?  Might she instead view this, like poor 
Colombe’s thesis, as “conceptual fuss in the service of nothing”?197  Renée, 
too, posits the special responsibility of the intellectual elite.  Facing the 
question of whether it is elitist to argue that people’s lives lack full dignity 
unless they have questioned and justified their convictions about what living 
well requires, Dworkin counters: “If so it is the elitism of a rational response to 
a question of capital importance.”198 
In sum, Renée’s view is that her family’s poverty and truncated formal 
education have ruled out the path of the responsible intellectual elite for her.  
Moreover, she states that she has “not chosen the easy path,” that is, those 
paths “taken by mortals to make their lives easier,” such as belief in God, 
which “appeases our animal fears and the unbearable prospect that someday all 
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our pleasures will cease,” or having children (and grandchildren), which helps 
us “defer the painful task of confronting ourselves,” or television, which 
“distracts us from the onerous necessity of finding projects” and “releases our 
mind from the great work of making meaning.”199  Her worldview, to the 
contrary, faces head-on “the cosmic awareness of absurdity,” and “the 
certainty of the end and the anticipation of the void.”200  Similarly, Dworkin 
stresses the challenge of making something of our lives in the face of 
inevitable death. 
The friendship she forms with Kakuro opens a “meteoric breach in time.”201  
It disrupts her path and is, in effect, another rebirth.  This rebirth was even 
more traumatic (yet also more liberating) than the one she experienced as a 
child when reading opened up a world that was accessible and yet inaccessible 
to her.  With Kakuro, she feels “utterly trusting” and finds mutual 
understanding.202  She can open up her soul and share “the things that 
constitute the tiny portion of meaning and emotion that [her] incongruous 
existence has stolen from the universe.”203  Renée comes to realize that while 
her sister died “from wanting to be reborn,” rebirth is possible for her. 
When she reveals this traumatic experience to Paloma as her reason for 
wanting to refuse Kakuro’s dinner invitation, she exclaims: “My God . . . my 
God, Paloma, how silly I am!”204  To her surprise, Paloma finds hope in 
Renée’s story, that “it seems that it might be possible to change one’s fate after 
all.”205  This experience of finding friendship leads Renée to observe, “maybe 
this, then, is what life is all about.”206 
The author at this point makes a startling plot choice: just as Renée 
experiences this dawning of new possibility, a dry cleaning truck strikes and 
kills her when she rushes into the street to rescue the local tramp, who 
suddenly veered off in the path of traffic.  Here, her personal morality entails a 
deed that goes beyond the easy rescue that Dworkin contemplates people owe 
each other as part of the duty to aid, since she put herself at risk in rescuing the 
tramp.207  Why kill Renée off just as her life opens up?  Perhaps the author 
deliberately plays with Renée’s prior determinism about the risk of forming 
friendship across class lines: the truck is from the dry cleaning company that 
cleaned the dress that Manuela gave her (“borrowed” from a deceased client of 
a seamstress friend) to wear to a dinner with Kakuro.  Manuela takes this as a 
sign of fate (even though a relative of the deceased client ultimately gave her 
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friend the dress).  When she learns of Renée’s death, Manuela collapses, 
begging Renée to forgive her. 
Renée’s final reflections, however, are not of determinism, but are more in 
line with what Dworkin might call recognizing the adverbial value of life: 
How to measure a life’s worth?  The important thing, said Paloma one 
day, is not the fact of dying, it is what you were doing in the moment of 
your death.  What was I doing in the moment of my death, I wonder, with 
an answer ready in the warmth of my heart. 
What was I doing? 
I had met another, and was prepared to love. 
After fifty-four years of emotional and psychological wilderness, hardly 
touched by the tenderness of someone like Lucien, who was little more 
than a resigned shadow of my self, after fifty-years of clandestinity and 
silent victories inside the padded walls of a lonely mind, after fifty-four 
years of venting my futile frustrations upon a world and a caste I 
despised, after these fifty-four years of nothingness, where I met no one 
and was never with another:  
Manuela, always. 
But also Kakuro. 
And Paloma, my kindred soul. 
My camellias. 
I would gladly share a last cup of tea with you.208 
As Renée reflects back on her life, she focuses not on the notion that she has 
made a narrative wreck of it, as Dworkin might anticipate.  Instead, she 
focuses on where she is in the present moment, on opening her heart and 
leaving behind her solitary life as a hedgehog. 
As the book progresses, Paloma, too, develops and refines a vision of 
personal ethics and morality that accepts what Dworkin’s responsibility project 
of making something of one’s life.  Unlike Renée, Paloma is a child of 
privilege, but she, too, wrestles with whether her family origins determine her 
path.  When she first meets Kakuro’s five-year-old great-niece who “looks at 
people with the same kindly, open gaze as her great-uncle,” for the first time 
she has “met someone whose fate is not predictable, . . . whose paths in life 
still remain open, someone who is fresh and full of possibility.”209  This leads 
her to wonder whether her own fate is written on her face, or whether, “if, in 
our world, there is any chance of becoming the person you haven’t yet 
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become.”210  She wonders, “[W]ill I know how to seize that chance, turn my 
life into a garden that will be completely different from my forebears?”211 
Paloma’s developing worldview might comfortably fit Dworkin’s notion of 
adverbial value.  At the same time, she believes that one’s life has value when 
it has an impact on others – another measure of life’s value that Dworkin 
discusses.  She comes to believe that “[w]hat matters is building well,” and 
assigns herself “a new obligation”: “I’m going to stop undoing, deconstructing, 
I’m going to start building. . . .  What matters is what you are doing when you 
die.”212  At this point, she still plans to end her life on her thirteenth birthday, 
but wants to be building on that day.  Her conclusion that what matters is 
building in the present finds reinforcement as she contemplates the process of 
aging and the indignities of retirement homes:  
We have to live with the certainty that we’ll get old and that it won’t look 
nice or be good or feel happy.  And tell ourselves that it’s now that 
matters: to build something, now, at any price, using all our strength.  
Always remember that there’s a retirement home waiting somewhere and 
so we have to surpass ourselves every day, make every day undying.  
Climb our own personal Everest and do it in such a way that every step is 
a little bit of eternity.  That’s what the future is for: to build the present, 
with real plans, made by living people.213 
This worldview seems to include a dose of determinism; if Renée disclaims 
any notion of a fixed calling for the responsible intellectual, so long as she or 
he is serving humanity, Paloma seems to think every animal or human being 
has a special task.  For example, Colombe thinks that she will torment Paloma 
by describing the mating behavior of the queen bee and the fate of the drones 
that impregnate her.  Paloma instead finds an affinity between the fate of bees 
and humans and a common theme of constructive activity: 
Personally I think there is only one thing to do: find the task we have 
been placed on this earth to do, and accomplish it as best we can, with all 
our strength, without making things complicated or thinking there’s 
anything divine about our animal nature.  This is the only way we will 
ever feel that we have been doing something constructive when death 
comes to get us.  Freedom, choice, will, and so on?  Chimeras.  We think 
we can make honey without sharing in the fate of bees, but we are in truth 
nothing but poor bees, destined to accomplish our task and then die.214 
After she listens to Renée’s traumatic story about her sister’s death, Paloma 
concludes that her own task may be to try to heal others.  She sees that she 
herself had been sick and suffering “because [she] couldn’t make anyone else 
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around [her] feel better,” or heal her family.215  But Paloma was able to help 
Renée.216  She realizes that she no longer wants to end her life.  She feels “like 
letting other people be good for [her],” and asks herself: “Morally, do I have 
the right to let this chance go by?”217  She thinks that she has “found [her] 
calling”: “I thought I’d understood that in order to heal, I could heal others, or 
at least the other ‘healable’ people, the ones who can be saved – instead of 
moping because I can’t save other people.”218  But she also worries that for 
every Renée, there are many “dreary” people like Colombe, as well.219  By the 
book’s end, Paloma credits Renée with teaching her to embrace the project of 
finding beauty in the world, of moments of “always within never.”220 
Recognition is a transformative force for both Renée and Paloma – of being 
seen and of seeing in an open way.  Kakuro and his young great-niece model 
such a way of seeing.  We could speak of this in the familiar terms of an ethic 
of recognition or in Dworkin’s terms of self-respect and authenticity.  That is, 
if we accept the dignitary principle of self-respect, that “[e]ach person must 
take his own life seriously: he must accept that it is a matter of importance that 
his life be a successful performance rather than a wasted opportunity,” then 
this leads to a moral principle that it is also objectively important that other 
people’s lives go well.221  So, too, with the second principle of authenticity: if 
each person has a special responsibility for his or her own life, then this leads 
to a personal morality that recognizes that every other person also has a special 
responsibility for his own life.  
By treating Renée with respect, by truly seeing her, Kakuro disrupts the 
hierarchical value system in the building.  Clearly, he does not share the 
system and believes it has no place in the contemporary world.  When he 
assesses Manuela as an aristocrat, he tells Renée: “You see, you are not the 
only one who goes against the social norm.  What’s the harm in that?  This is 
the twenty-first century, for goodness’ sake!”222  His presence in the building 
helps Paloma and Renée see each other differently and how each hides her true 
identity from the rest of the world.  With Kakuro’s help, Paloma realizes that 
Renée has “the elegance of the hedgehog,” and Renée recognizes Paloma as a 
princess, an appropriate member of her inner aristocratic circle. 
This recognition contrasts with the failure of vision – as well as of respect – 
by other residents in the building.  These relationships illustrate threats to 
dignity.  For example, reflecting back on the death of her husband and co-
concierge, Renée observes that the grief of a concierge for her husband does 
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not register in the same way as the grief of a family for a resident.  When 
Kakuro comes to Paloma’s apartment, crying, to tell her of Renée’s accident 
and death, her mother is at first alarmed, squeezing Paloma’s hand very hard, 
but then is relieved when she learns that “Renée” is Madame Michel, the 
concierge.  This reaction disgusts Kakuro and alienates Paloma.223 
Through Renée’s interactions with residents other than Paloma and Kakuro, 
the author illustrates how people fail to see Renée or to respect her boundaries.  
When Paloma’s sister rings Renée’s door at seven o’clock on a Sunday 
morning, and expresses amazement to learn that there are hours when the 
concierge is unavailable, she then fumes to her mother, calling Renée a 
“nonentity.”224  When Renée is off-duty on Sunday afternoon, on her way to 
watch a film with Kakuro, a resident tells her to water the plants since she is 
already on the stairwell.  After she begins to shed her external protective shell, 
and is on Kakuro’s arm, ready to go out to dinner for his birthday, her hair 
newly cut and wearing a dress procured by Manuela from a client’s deceased 
mother, the residents of the building do not recognize her, addressing her as 
Madame.  When their lack of recognition astonishes her, Kakuro replies: “It is 
because they have never seen you. . . .  I would recognize you anywhere.”225  
III. REFLECTIONS ON NARRATIVE IN LIFE, LAW, AND LITERATURE 
I have argued that Dworkin’s forthcoming book, Justice for Hedgehogs, 
goes well beyond the four corners of conventional jurisprudence to offer an 
ambitious argument for the unity of value.  Although law is a very small part 
of the book, some of its methodology is evocative of a work in law and 
literature.  Both a careful examination of interpretation and the use of analogies 
between life and art, or life and narrative, play a constitutive role in his project.  
Indeed, his choice to address his reader as “you” creates an intimate style 
evocative of a literary, rather than a jurisprudential, work.  Moreover, 
Dworkin’s normative argument about how to integrate ethics and morality 
offers a narrative view of life and of personal responsibility: “Each person,” he 
argues, “has a special, personal responsibility for identifying what counts as 
success in his own life; he has a personal responsibility to create that life 
through a coherent narrative that he himself has chosen and endorses.”226  He 
proposes to unite personal ethics and personal morality by demonstrating how 
acceptance of these two principles spills over into recognition of the objective 
importance of other people’s lives and narrative responsibilities.  His method 
engages a “first person,” rather than “third person,” approach to ethics that 
examines how people think about the decisions they confront.  It has been 
useful, thus, to read his book in light of the best-selling novel, The Elegance of 
the Hedgehog, which deploys two alternating first-person narratives, those of 
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Renée and Paloma, to explore “the bearing philosophy could really have on 
one’s life.”227  I have explored the contrast between Dworkin’s use of the 
hedgehog – to connote faith in value holism – and Barbery’s – to capture the 
concealed elegance of a closet intellectual.  These books proved to have some 
surprising, and illuminating, points of convergence and divergence: the novel’s 
characters, I have argued, accept a special responsibility to make something of 
their lives.  Like Dworkin, they ponder the meaning of life and of art and the 
challenge posed by our animal nature.  
But both authors’ use of narrative invite us to consider the reasons that 
people resort to the use of narratives.  In law, for example, one premise of the 
keen interest in storytelling a few decades ago was that bringing new narratives 
to law, having outsiders tell their stories, could challenge the status quo and 
disrupt settled understandings that excluded outsiders from full acceptance and 
equality.228  As Kim Scheppele observed in the introduction to one prominent 
symposium on storytelling, telling alternate stories is a way of challenging “the 
way we do things around here.”229  Scheppele contends that “[s]tories carry 
power because they have the ability to convey truths.”230  This is the disruptive 
power about which Minow wrote in another collection on law and stories.231  
Feminist theorists and critical race theorists urged, for example, putting forth 
many stories so that previously excluded perspectives would be heard.  
Renée’s narrative, no doubt, is one of an outsider, whose self-imposed solitary 
life was a response to unjust background conditions and expected class 
prejudice.  Yet her closet intellectual life brings out Paloma’s story – one of a 
child of privilege who questions the value system of those around her.  One 
effect of Barbery’s use of these narratives might be, then, to cause readers to 
wonder about whether, in their own lives, they manifest a similar lack of vision 
to those of the building residents in their own dealing with people they 
encounter in everyday life who are different, less privileged, in serving 
positions, and the like.  Manuela is an aristocrat, Renée observes, because she 
maintains her dignity despite the indignities she encounters as a cleaning 
woman.232  Renée’s narrative might also lead the non-French reader to wonder 
how class prejudice and hierarchy in France is similar to or different from that 
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in the United States, where the American Dream is that people of the humblest 
origins can rise to the greatest heights.  The reader might also wonder about the 
narrative the author does not provide: that of Kakuro and how he was able to 
develop a way of seeing that broke free of class prejudice and the 
preconceptions of those around him.  Was it because he grew up in Japan 
instead of France?  Reading these narratives in light of Dworkin’s dignitary 
principles also suggests the importance of dignity, of “a right to be treated as a 
human being whose dignity matters.”233 
Two decades after the initial flurry of interest in law and literature and in 
storytelling, legal academics appear to retain considerable interest in these 
methods and their possible insights on basic matters of justice.234  Of 
continuing value, for example, is James Boyd White’s observation that great 
works of literature may allow a person engaging with them to become an 
“ideal reader,” who “recognizes the claims of others” and develops “the virtues 
of toleration and of justice.”235  Both law and literature, he further argues, 
invite attention to questions of voice, justice, and community.  For example, in 
“reading law,” we can learn to ask: Whose voices are allowed to be heard, 
what relationships exist among them, and what kind of community shall we 
be?236  The imminent publication of Dworkin’s book provides a new 
opportunity to reflect on the connections between law and literature.  No 
doubt, legal scholars – and other readers – will also reflect on the challenge 
Dworkin poses in arguing for value holism rather than value pluralism.  On the 
one hand, the profusion of stories, as Minow suggests, seems to point us in the 
direction of pluralism.  Dworkin’s holism is at the level of principles.  
Although Dworkin’s political morality has not been my focus in this Article, it 
warrants noting that by insisting on the principle of authenticity, and the 
corresponding special responsibility of each to identify and pursue value in his 
or her own life, Dworkin hews close to the core liberal commitment to 
personal autonomy or personal self-government.  Pluralism remains to the 
extent that different people, making the best narrative of their lives, will make 
different choices, and government must not rob people of this special 
responsibility by compelling certain ethical choices over others.  In other work, 
for example, I have offered a liberal feminist argument that both governmental 
action and restraint play a proper role in a formative project that helps prepare 
persons to be capable and responsible; but, by contrast to Dworkin, I do not 
seek to offer a general account of ethics and morality, hewing more closely to 
Rawls’s political liberalism in this regard.237  
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Finally, Dworkin’s use of the narrative view of life and of the responsibility 
project in which we should all engage will likely invite critical responses by 
those who question the possibility of narrative coherence.  A reader of this 
Article reminded me of the familiar saying: “Life is what happens when you 
are making other plans.”238  Minow notes how stories remind us of the 
messiness and complexity of life and seem to resist systematizing.239  Renée’s 
narrative itself, with its stunning plot twist of an auto accident that cuts her life 
short just as she was blossoming and opening up to a new integration in her 
life, may serve as further evidence of this complexity and of how life is not 
easily scripted.  At the same time, we might find some support in the 
hedgehog’s value holism in, as Paloma puts it, the “[b]eauty, in this world.”240 
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